where congresses take place, and sustained campaigns for international agreements on debt or climate change -it is significant that a major treatise has appeared which attempts to give a coherent theoretical shape to global conflicts. Empire is a rare thing in the present age, a systematic treatise in political theory which sets out an argument for revolution. Much of its interest lies in its systematicity -whether or not one agrees with its philosophical presuppositions, or with its socio-historical analysis, it is invaluable to see such an argument being constructed from first principles.
Just as liberal philosophers like Rawls or Nozick have set out systematic political philosophies from their foundational principles of individual rights and freedoms, so Hardt and Negri have sought to find systemic grounds for their utopian conception of revolution. For this they have looked to construct an ambitious post-Marxist synthesis of ideas whose most important single source is the work of Deleuze and Guattari, but which draws also on 'republican' political theory, Foucault, Spinoza, and Marx. Empire establishes a systematic and grounded argument for a transformative view of the present historical situation, from a revolutionary perspective, and one does not have to agree with its arguments to recognise it as a landmark in political theory. present state of world historical development, in terms of its system of governance, its mode of production, its forms of socialisation and subjective identity, and its potentials for transformation. Hardt and Negri share withindeed take from -Hegel and Marx a teleological theory of historical development, in which each new stage of evolution creates the potential for a fuller expression of human potential. They also share with Marx the idea that transitions from one stage of development to another are likely to be explosive, occasioned by crises and by sudden transformations in popular consciousness. Marx explained this process largely by reference to the development of the means of production, and the overcoming of scarcity that this made possible. The advance of capitalist forms of production across the globe was a transitional stage for Marx in the later emergence of socialist forms of life. Hardt's and Negri's analysis also gives priority to the global diffusion of capitalism, but they are less interested in its material than in its political, juridical, cultural, and subjective dimensions. Where for Marx the alienation and eventual reclamation of human productive powers were the principal issue, for Hardt and Negri the political and subjective dimensions of the appropriation of human powers is at least as important.
Hardt's and Negri's thinking has been shaped by Foucault and by Deleuze and Guattari as well as by Marxist political economy, and they give as much attention to changing forms of governmentality as to changing forms of production. 'The space of imperial sovereignty', they argue, 'is smooth'. What this means is that the various boundaries and barriers, not least those of national sovereignties, are being swept away by global capitalism. This creation of 'one world', with no 'outside', as they put it, creates a potentially unified space in which the liberation of 'the multitude' by its own action becomes possible. Hardt and Negri seem more anarchist than Marxist in their identification of governmental powers, not economic exploitation, as the main obstacles to human liberation. 'Empire' also signifies an emergent form of global governance, but we will consider this later.
discourses.
i From neo-Marxist political economy is brought an analysis of the post-Fordist, post-industrial revolution. The loss of hegemony of industrial production, and its partial supercession by an economy based on information and affect, is transforming, in the authors' view, the labour process, and creating a much greater potential for mass resistance, and for the reappropriation of their own labour power by citizens, than was possible within the previous industrial regime. The argument here is that the 'virtual' character of much modern production, and the importance of symbolic production, especially the media, invests power in active subjects, and thereby removes it from the owners and controllers of material resources. accomplished through disciplinary institutions such as 'the prison, the factory, the asylum, the hospital, the university, the school and so forth.' They argue that this paradigm of power ruled throughout the first phase of capitalist accumulation. By contrast, the society of control is one 'which develops at the far edge of modernity and opens towards the postmodern,' and is one in which 'mechanisms of command become ever more "democratic," ever more immanent to the social field...' Social control becomes interiorised within subjects themselves. It is exercised directly on the minds and bodies of subjects, through information systems and welfare practices.
iii It thus extends well outside 'the structured sites of social institutions,' into the fabric of everyday life. This amounts to a form of 'bio-power' that regulates life from the interior of subjects, a power which they 'embrace and reactivate' from their own accord. (P23-4).
There is a parallel -indeed a fusion -between the 'virtual' and 'immanent'
properties of labour in the post-industrial economy, and the 'interiorised' forms of control of the new kind of governmentality. Hardt and Negri are describing a destruction or compression of many previous differences and boundaries. 25) The idea that the subjectivisation of power, and the virtualisation of To put this in an older terminology, the multitude which is being constituted by the global capitalist world order as a class in itself, can now seize the moment to assert itself as a class for itself. Hardt's and Negri's description of the major trends of development of both the capitalist economy, and of its major forms of governance, is plainly in accord with much current analysis of globalisation. Shifts between economic sectors, the dominant role of the information economy, the 'subjectivisation' of life, not least through the salience of consumption, and the weakening of insulating and defensive boundaries of many kinds, including those provided by the nation state at its zenith, are well attested, and are now almost an orthodoxy in social theory. The contentious issue is not whether a transformation and hegemonisation of consumer capitalism has been taking place, but whether this justifies the political argument that Hardt and Negri draw from it, to the effect that the economic system has now generated a universal proletariat. One also needs to review the larger dynamics of September 11 and its aftermath in the light of Hardt's and Negri's analysis. Unfortunately, when one considers the kinds of political action that might be expected to take place in the 'smooth' interconnected spaces of Empire, by globalised, subjectively empowered, rhizomatic networks, Al Quaida seems to qualify for inclusion as well as NGO volunteers or journalists working in disaster areas. xvi Hardt and Negri say, evoking Nietzsche, that 'a new nomad horde, a new race of barbarians, will arise to invade or evacuate Empire'. (P. 213).
They refer, quoting Walter Benjamin, to a 'positive barbarism', which, coming from a 'poverty of experience' has 'to begin anew, to begin from the new. ….. is an instinct necessary for survival in the capitalist market, and the more exposed the markets, the greater the pressures to be aggressive. The violence of which a nation such as the United States is capable, both towards its own deviants and its perceived external enemies, derives from its own dominant principle of existence. It has seemed surprising that the triumph of global capitalism over its communist rival in 1989 should have been followed by an intensification, rather than a diminution of fear and anxiety.
We have never been in greater danger than now, President Bush has recently said, which considering that the earlier danger was of massive nuclear attack is paradoxical. xviii It may even be that the more unfettered and triumphant capitalism is, the higher the levels of underlying anxiety and fear to which it gives rise. This may also explain why it is that U. ii A curious feature of their argument is that whereas Marx thought the road to class solidarity and revolution lay in the socialisation of the production process, Hardt and Negri derive this possibility from what is in many an respects an individualisation of the labour process.
iii So far as those who work in these systems are concerned, the evidence is that these 'interiorised forms of control' are effective rather than otherwise. The training and compliance procedures now ubiquitous in their management -competency-based learning, qualityassurance and the like -impose tight control on these labour processes, and are inimical to free thinking. iv This is a reference to Deleuze and Guattari's book of that title. v See David Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences. vi The difference in tone and assumption between these sections is very striking, and suggests that it may derive from differences of approach between the two authors. vii The importance of the Gulf War derives rather from the fact that it presented the United States as the only power able to manage international justice not as a function of its own national motives but in the name of global right.' (P. 180). viii There are of course important differences between the forms of territorial domination effected by the United States, and by the European colonial empires. But at this point these seem to have more to do with strategic interests and forms of mediating power (capital, long distance weaponry, the purchase of governments, in contrast to trade and direct territorial occupation), than with the contrast Hardt and Negri seek to make between old imperial power and some new deterritorialised form of global order. xvii Its components are 'the right to global citizenship', 'the right to a social wage', and 'the right to reappropriation' (of the means of production). The right to education and information might usefully be added to this list. xviii It is noteworthy that a concept of security based on mutual deterrence served to manage anxieties about the Soviet Union, within that rather highly structured contest, but is deemed irrelevant to the containment of so relatively weak a nation as Iraq.
